State Capacity and Non-state Service Provision in Fragile and Conflict-affected States by Batley, Richard & Mcloughlin, Claire
et 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
State Capacity and Non-state Service Provision in 
Fragile and Conflict-affected States 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
February 2009 
Richard Batley and Claire Mcloughlin
 2 
Contents 
Executive Summary ................................................................................................................ 4 
1. Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 8 
Purpose and approach .......................................................................................................... 8 
Outline of the issues .............................................................................................................. 9 
Elements of the analysis - willingness and capacity ........................................................... 10 
What is distinct about the context of fragile and conflict-affected states? .......................... 11 
2. Relationships between state and non-state actors in service provision .................... 13 
Forms of engagement ......................................................................................................... 13 
The technical case for state intervention............................................................................. 13 
Non-state provision and the context for relationships with the state ................................... 15 
3. Lessons from the exercise of state roles ........................................................................ 18 
Policy environment and dialogue ........................................................................................ 18 
Regulation and facilitation ................................................................................................... 21 
Contracting .......................................................................................................................... 23 
Informal and mutual agreements ........................................................................................ 28 
4. The focus of approaches to enhancing state effectiveness ......................................... 30 
5. Conclusion and policy implications: How can governments effectively engage with 
non-state providers of basic services where capacity is weak? ...................................... 33 
Key lessons from the case studies ...................................................................................... 33 
Lessons in relation to specific roles .................................................................................... 34 
Policy implications ............................................................................................................... 35 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
 
Authors and contributors 
This report was prepared for DFID by Richard Batley (International Development 
Department, University of Birmingham) and Claire Mcloughlin (Governance and 
Social Development Resource Centre). Correspondence can be sent to 
Claire@gsdrc.org  
 
The following people recommended literature for the report: Lyndsay Bird 
(UNESCO), Derick Brinkerhoff (George Washington University), Taylor Brown (The 
IDL Group), Stephen Commins (University of California, Los Angeles), Kara Hanson 
(London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine), David Jackson (UNDP 
Indonesia), Clare Lockhart (Institute for State Effectiveness), Patrick Meagher 
(University of Maryland), Pauline Rose (University of Sussex), Kevin Sansom 
(University of Loughborough). Particular thanks go to Enrico Pavignani (Private 
Consultant, Mozambique) for comments on an earlier draft. 
 
 
 
 
 
 4 
Executive Summary 
 
This paper set out to identify how states with weak capacity can effectively fulfil the 
„indirect‟ service provider roles of co-ordinating, financing, and setting and applying 
standards for the provision of basic services by non-state providers (NSPs). Four 
categories of indirect role are identified: 1) setting the policy environment and 
engaging in policy dialogue, 2) regulating and facilitating, 3) contracting, and 4) 
entering into mutual and informal agreements. Through these indirect roles, the state 
can in principle assume responsibility for the provision of basic services without 
necessarily being involved in direct provision.   
 
Most non-state provision operates free from any systematic government intervention, 
co-ordination or oversight - the scale and often informal nature of non-state providers 
means they are usually unrecognised. But non-state actors (including entrepreneurs, 
voluntary organisations and NGOs, faith-based and community organisations, and 
households) are the predominant providers of primary health-care, water supply and 
sanitation, and important providers of basic education to all sections of the population 
in the majority of developing countries, not exclusively in fragile and conflict affected 
states.  
 
Whilst there is no simple relationship between levels of state weakness and levels of 
non-state provision, state fragility and/or conflict can result in a parallel system of 
non-state service delivery which is fragmented and uneven. Paradoxically, the need 
for large-scale approaches and quick co-ordination of services in fragile and post-
conflict settings may require „prematurely high‟ levels of state-NSP engagement, 
before the development of the underlying institutional structures that would support 
them.  
 
Relations between state and non-state providers are affected by national histories, 
often leading to mistrust and a preference on both sides not to engage. State motives 
for intervention in non-state service delivery are driven more by historical evolution, 
ideologies and power relationships than by technical considerations, but nevertheless 
the technical case for intervention is important to understand. In fragile and conflict-
affected settings, donors see the case for intervention in terms of the state building 
imperative.  
 
Only in the most extreme humanitarian circumstances do donors consider it 
appropriate wholly to bypass the state and substitute for the indirect roles. Where 
there is will, donors have supported the capacity of government to perform large-
scale contracting and national level policy dialogue and policy frameworks. Less 
attention has been given to supporting the sphere of regulation, or the development 
of informal and mutual agreements between state and non state actors.  
 
State interventions that imply a direct controlling role for the state and which impose 
obligations on NSPs (i.e. contracting and regulation) require greater capacity (on 
both sides) and present greater risk of harm if performed badly than the roles of 
policy dialogue and entering into mutual agreements. In fragile and conflict-affected 
settings, capacity deficits are particularly acute in the following areas: 
 
- The environment of non-state provision is typically one of policy unreliability and 
legal instability. Relationships are frequently beset by ambivalence and mutual 
mistrust, built on histories of policy change and rivalry. Confidence and continuity 
in policy and practice, which may be needed to ensure long-term relationships, is 
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likely to be absent. Formal dialogue may be impractical because of lack of 
suitable policy „space‟, and is likely to exclude small and informal NSPs.  
- Even in relatively strong states, regulatory capacity is low. In weak states, 
incentives for regulation may be absent or malign. Regulatory organisations often 
lack staff, skills, enforcement powers, or information on the sector to be 
regulated. Establishing or applying a regulatory framework for small-scale, 
informal non-state providers is particularly difficult.  
- Contracting requires a supportive external environment of public sector 
institutional rules, laws and policies which is likely to be absent in unstable 
settings. There can also be profound constraints on contracting in the form of 
social and political resistance, lack of information on the cost and quality of 
service provision to enable the specification of contracts, and insufficient 
resources for monitoring. Tight performance based contracts may require a level 
of professional and organisational capacity that rules out local and informal 
providers.  
- Informal partnership arrangements which rely on trust that has developed 
incrementally may be a means of achieving collective goals when there is a good 
strategic fit between collaborators, and when the benefits of partnership outweigh 
individual action. However, local relationships in the form of mutual agreements 
and co-production present problems of scaling-up into large programmes. 
 
Summary of general lessons from the case studies  
 
Government capacity to plan, co-ordinate, organise, regulate and finance the 
non-state sector is severely constrained in fragile and conflict affected 
settings, most acutely because of the state‟s weak legitimacy, coverage and 
competence, but also due to lack of basic information about the non-state sector and 
lack of basic organisational capacity to form and maintain relationships with NSPs.  
 
There may be reluctance on the part of governments to withdraw from the 
direct role of provider to take on the indirect roles of oversight and 
stewardship. Governments may be more willing to engage with NSPs where there is 
recognition that government cannot alone deliver all services, and where public and 
private services are not in competition.  
 
Where there is lack of willingness to engage, governments may need evidence 
that successful collaboration is possible. This can be demonstrated through small 
scale, pilot approaches at the local level.   
 
As much as government capacity, the capacity and willingness of non-state 
actors influences the potential for successful engagement. Understanding the 
nature of the non-state sector in any given context (size, formality, level of 
organisation), and the limits to its own willingness to engage with government, is an 
important starting point for designing forms of mutually beneficial engagement.  
 
The extent to which engagements are ‘pro-service’ may also be influenced by: 
a) Government motives for engagement. Real, underlying motives can range 
from the wish to prohibit, control or takeover NSP, to genuinely seeking 
partnership.  
b) The extent to which the providers that are most important to poor people 
are engaged. Informal or small providers are often overlooked or excluded. 
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Summary of lessons in relation to specific roles  
 
Formal policy dialogue between government and NSPs, which requires a stable 
policy environment, may be imperfect, unrepresentative and at times unhelpful 
in fragile settings. It is very often constrained by mistrust, lack of credibility or 
legitimacy associated with all actors and prone to being hijacked by large NGOs. 
Spaces for dialogue need to allow actors autonomy, should seek to find 
complementarities, and should ultimately lead to other forms of engagement (e.g. 
partnership, or agreement about standard setting). Dialogue at this level is at best 
only an entry point to effective collaboration between state- and non-state actors. 
 
Informal dialogue - at the operational level - could more likely be where 
synergies can be found. This is where mutual lessons can be learned and an 
understanding of constraints on both sides developed. This type of dialogue is likely 
to be ongoing but can either be pro-service or anti-service. 
 
Regulation is more likely to be ‘pro-service’ where it offers incentives for 
compliance, and where it focuses on standards in terms of outputs and 
outcomes rather than inputs and entry controls. Command and control regulation 
has been unnecessarily elaborate and input-focused, and is largely unenforced or 
avoided. Two alternatives place less demands on the actors and may be more 
focused on improving services: (i) „lighter touch‟ forms of regulation, where the rules 
are slimmed down, focused more on the quality of outputs and based more on 
incentives than controls, and (ii) substitutes for state regulation, such as external and 
self-accreditation, franchised service provision and community monitoring. 
 
Wide scale, performance-based contracting has been successful in delivering 
services in some fragile and post-conflict settings. The sustainability of 
institutional arrangements for contracting that are separate from, or completely 
bypass, governments is often questioned. Partner country government ministries 
should be active participants in planning and developing contracting where possible. 
Where institutional arrangements bypass normal governmental channels they distort 
accountability relationships. The relationship between (semi-)independent contracting 
agencies and the potential for the progressive capacitation of the state is unknown.  
 
Some successful contractual agreements with NGOs have a strong informal, 
relational element and grow out of earlier informal connections. They have 
worked well where responsibility for contracting is devolved to the level of 
government responsible for implementing it. There is a need for clarity of roles, but 
also flexibility to allow NGOs to draw on their strengths and to innovate. Small-scale 
contracts can be tailored to the local context, and allow the incremental development 
of capacity. Capacities required for contracting will differ according to the sector, and 
the scale, level of formality, and length of contract. 
 
Informal and mutual agreements, based on independent contributions by the 
partners and non-hierarchic relationships between them can avoid the capacity 
problems and tensions implicit in formal contracting but may present other 
problems of non-transparency, exclusion of competition, and possible abuse of the 
trust on which they are founded. 
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Summary of policy implications  
 
Recognise non-state service provision and adopt the ‘do no harm’ principle.  
NSP is here to stay, and may even grow and flourish in more stable states. This 
should not be seen as a problem in itself, but as part of the solution. It would be 
wrong to set the ambition of 'managing „ non-state provision in its entirety - this has 
not happened in any developing country - and it can be very harmful for low-capacity 
states to seek to regulate all NSP or to draw it into clumsy contracts.  
 
Beware of generalisation. Non-state provision takes many forms in response to 
different histories. Its particular organizational form and capacity, the importance of 
its activities, who it serves, its accessibility to sections of the population, and the 
nature of its relationship with the state vary greatly between locations. All these may 
shift rapidly in response to political and economic change. The possibilities and case 
for state engagement have to be assessed not assumed.  
 
The particular identities of NGOs and enterprises should be considered in deciding 
with whom and how the state should engage. While many NGOs and CBOs have an 
interest in working with government to improve service delivery, some forms of 
engagement may challenge the capacity and also threaten the autonomy of those 
that are nearer to being civil society actors. Classical contracts may be more suitable 
to enterprises; looser partnerships more suitable particularly to local NGOs.  
 
State building can occur through any of the types of engagement with NSPs. 
Types of engagement should therefore be selected on the basis of their likely 
effectiveness in improving service delivery. Governments and donors are faced 
with difficult strategic choices about how to deploy limited capacity for engagement 
with NSPs effectively and without risk to pro-poor or pro-service outcomes. In fragile 
or conflict-affected settings, there is the dual goal of supporting state building. There 
is no meaningful way of resolving this trade-off by deciding which of the possible 
functions would be more inclined to build states and then trying to bring them about 
regardless of context. Any of these functions can be a state building activity; the 
question is to identify in the particular country context, which if any mode of 
engagement would most enable improved service provision and be most feasible. 
 
Begin with less risky/small scale forms of engagement where possible. There 
may also be a trade-off between the effects of forms of engagement on service 
delivery and the risks resulting from bad engagement. In an ideal situation, 
contracting out service delivery and regulating non-state provision may present the 
quicker and more direct ways of bringing about improved service delivery but they 
also present risks of damaging existing service providers with no gain. Small-scale 
contracts and experiments in more localised regulation present less risk. Policy 
dialogue and attempts to improve the policy environment may have only long-term 
positive effects, but also carry small risks to non-state actors. Encouraging mutual 
agreements and coordination between state and non-state actors present 
opportunities for learning and no risk but can only have local immediate effects. 
 
Adopt mixed approaches. The choice between forms of engagement does not have 
to be absolute. Rather than adopting a uniform plan of engagement in a particular 
country, it may be better to try different approaches in different regions or sectors. 
This could reduce the strain on government, for example of having to manage 
dialogue, regulation or contracting on a uniform national basis. Different approaches 
also present the opportunity for trial and learning.  
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1. Introduction 
Purpose and approach 
This paper reviews the literature on the roles of the state in regard to the provision of 
basic services by non-state actors, in order to identify how these may be performed 
and supported where state capacity is weak. It examines the evidence on ways in 
which states1 have engaged with non-state providers (NSPs) - ostensibly at least to 
enhance the equity, efficiency and pro-poor delivery of services - in order to identify 
the factors determining successful engagement. The principal state roles considered 
are of setting the policy environment and promoting dialogue, regulation, and 
entering into agreements or contracts for the delivery of services. The services 
considered are primary health-care, primary education and basic water supply and 
sanitation.  
 
Section 1 outlines the core issues, identifies the features of fragile and conflict 
affected states that may influence the relationship between state and non-state 
actors and the relationship between state building2 and service delivery, and 
considers whether and how the available literature on relationships between states 
and non-state actors understands and addresses questions of (un)willingness and 
(in)capacity. Section 2 sets out the possible state roles and forms of engagement 
with non-state providers, outlining the technical case for intervention and contrasting 
this with the evolution of non-state provision and of the historical relationship 
between states and NSPs. Section 3 draws on available case study material on 
government-NSP engagement in fragile and conflict affected settings to determine 
the circumstances under which positive relationships may occur. In examining the 
evidence, this section considers the influence of capacity constraints on the part both 
of the state and of non-state actors, and how donors have facilitated engagement. 
Section 4 summarises the approaches that have been adopted to enhancing state 
effectiveness. A concluding section presents policy implications in relation to the 
aspects of capacity that may need to be strengthened, and the types of role that may 
best combine the twin objectives of state building and collaboration with non-state 
actors, given different levels of capacity.  
 
The review draws on case studies of NSP-government engagement and recent 
donor material on service delivery in fragile and conflict affected states. The literature 
has some limitations; there are few empirical case studies of government-NSP 
engagement in fragile and conflict affected settings; the information that is available 
specifically in relation to the types of roles states can perform is dominated by 
contracting; and there appear to be few publicly available evaluations or lessons 
learned from donor programmes which have aimed to strengthen state capacity to 
perform the indirect roles.3 As far as possible, the paper draws on examples from 
fragile and conflict affected states; however, the evidence base is thin (OECD 
2008a:39). Much of what is written about them is based on normative, scenario type 
statements, with isolated examples. We therefore also refer to the slightly broader 
literature on state/non-state relations in non-fragile states where capacity deficits may 
be comparable. It is relevant to do so given that the broad conclusion from research 
                                                 
1
 The term 'state' is used to cover government (the policy-making arm) as well as public administration and agencies. 
2
 State building in situations of fragility is defined by OECD DAC as: „An endogenous process to enhance capacity, 
institutions and legitimacy of the state driven by state-society relations: In its simplest form, state building is the 
process of states functioning more effectively. Understood in this positive context, it can be deﬁned as an 
endogenous process to develop capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state driven by state-society 
relationships.‟ (OECD DAC, 2008:1) 
3
 In undertaking this literature review, key international experts were contacted in an effort to gather relevant literature 
and grey material. Nevertheless, collecting publicly unavailable information in order to map donor programmes would 
require more systematic contact with donors and was beyond the scope and terms of reference for this study.    
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on service provision in most developing countries is that the roles of the state are 
poorly undertaken, and that most non-state provision is not governed by any 
systematic intervention. It is the exceptional cases of effective collaboration and 
coordination that have to be explained. 
 
Outline of the issues 
Though the evidence is by no means comprehensive, national studies indicate that 
non-state actors (including entrepreneurs, voluntary organisations and NGOs, faith-
based and community organisations, and households) are the predominant providers 
of primary health-care, water supply and sanitation, and important providers of basic 
education to all sections of the population. This is probably true in the majority of 
developing countries, not exclusively in fragile states. There is no simple relationship 
between levels of state weakness and levels of non-state provision. 
 
One response to the predominance of non-state provision might be to allow it to 
operate unhindered. This is the de facto though not de jure policy in most of the low-
income countries for which there is evidence. States are often unable or unwilling to 
control or substitute for non-state provision. Indeed, why should they intervene in 
competitive „market‟ provision? In regard to fragile states, the OECD DAC (2008a 
and b) offers two answers. First, where state building is the central objective, states 
gain legitimacy by being seen to provide services as part of the social contract with 
citizens. Ghani and Lockhart (2005:11) warn about the negative impact that non-state 
provision of core state functions can potentially have on the legitimacy and 
sovereignty of the state. Second, even if non-state actors are the direct providers of 
services to clients, there are some specific services (e.g. vaccination) and some 
indirect coordination, oversight and „purchasing‟ functions (setting policy frameworks 
and ensuring service provision by setting standards, coordinating, regulating and 
financing) that independent providers left alone will not provide efficiently or at all.              
 
Through these indirect functions, the state assumes responsibility for provision 
without necessarily being involved in delivery at all. In fragile and conflict affected 
states, whether and which of the direct or indirect provider functions the state should 
take on is presented by the OECD DAC (2008b: 40) as a matter that depends on its 
willingness and capacity - the defining characteristics of fragility4. Only in the most 
extreme humanitarian circumstances does the OECD DAC consider it appropriate for 
donors wholly (in regard to direct and indirect service provision) to bypass the state, 
with the risk of yet further undermining state capacity and accountability. Commins 
(2006) describes this as a trade-off between accountability and service delivery.  
 
Even in less extreme circumstances, there are possible trade-offs between state 
building and the state‟s involvement in NSP which should affect the decision whether 
and how the state should intervene. One possibility is that what is good for state 
building may not be good for service delivery – for example, attempts by the state to 
regulate NSP may divert non-state actors from service delivery or be used for rent-
seeking by government officials. Another trade-off may be between service delivery 
and accountability – for example, contracting NGOs to provide services on terms set 
by government may have the effect of emasculating their autonomy as civil society 
actors (thus ultimately undermining state building) (as Howell and Lind 2008 argue 
for Afghanistan). 
 
                                                 
4
 See Rose and Greeley (2006) for a useful elaboration of these concepts. 
 
 10 
Elements of the analysis - willingness and capacity 
There are different ways of understanding relationships between actors and 
explaining their performance. Because this paper is based on a literature review, it 
refers to the factors that are employed by studies as explanations of the performance 
of roles. However, it is guided as far as possible by the OECD documentation on 
fragile states and its understanding of capacity and willingness to perform key 
government functions for the benefit of all: 
1. Capacity means having the core features that enable the state to mobilise 
resources for key objectives, and is determined by territorial control, effective 
exercise of political power, basic competence in economic management and 
sufficient administrative capacity for policy implementation. 
2. Willingness refers to explicit political commitment to policies supporting 
human welfare. It is affected by the basis of the state‟s legitimacy in sources 
of support.  
 
The studies we refer to are very largely not influenced directly by these categories.  
Most studies of state and non-state (particularly NGOs) agencies compare their 
comparative advantages as service providers (efficiency, proximity to clients etc) 
without considering how they might work together (Moran 2004). Some look at the 
performance of relationships in terms of outputs and outcomes, rather than at the 
capacity factors that determine performance. Others, including work on NSPs 
previously commissioned by DFID5, use a more comprehensive view of capacity than 
just „administrative capacity‟ (see point 1 above), based on the model of Hilderbrand 
and Grindle (2005). This covers (i) factors internal to an organisation – human 
resources, organisational arrangements, capital and finance, (ii) inter-organisational 
coordination within the task network, and (iii) the wider institutional environment and 
how this constrains or supports personal and organisational capacity. In a similar 
vein, Brinkerhoff (2007:1) summarises the definition of capacity as „having the 
aptitudes, resources, relationships and facilitating conditions that are necessary to 
act effectively to achieve some intended purpose‟. Most studies (as also the OECD) 
focus on the capacity of state agencies but, recognising that the concern is with the 
functioning of relationships, some examine the other side – the willingness and 
capacity of non-state bodies that might provide services or take on the state‟s core 
roles. 
 
The direct concern with capacity is not the universal or even the main concern of 
academic studies, although they can be seen as relevant to the broader view of 
capacity. Many focus on the nature of inter-organisational relationships and, 
especially where NGOs are involved, the quality of their relations with government 
(complementary, cooperative, conflictual etc) and their effects on organisational 
identity and autonomy. Much of the literature emphasises the need to examine and 
explain relationships in their historical and institutional context: the long-term 
structuring of relations between state, market and civil society, and how these create 
path dependencies that limit the options that are possible and considered desirable 
(see references in Teamey and Mcloughlin 2009). By comparison, there are 
„technically determinist‟ studies that explore how the economic characteristics of 
goods and services and types of market failure logically imply certain sorts of state 
intervention or partnership (see section 2). 
 
                                                 
5
 Mills et al 2001, Batley and Larbi 2004, Batley 2006, Palmer 2006, Rose 2006, Sansom 2006  
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What is distinct about the context of fragile and conflict-affected states? 
The OECD establishes four scenarios within two broad categories – (a) declining 
states with arrested development or with deteriorating effectiveness, and (b) 
stabilising states embarked on post-conflict transition or on early recovery. For each 
of these, the capacity and willingness variables are differently permutated with 
different strategic implications. The stabilising (and especially „early recovery‟) cases 
present the slightly more optimistic situations where will and capacity have ceased to 
decline and may be growing. „(I)n deteriorating conditions it might not be feasible or 
appropriate to work with the state, while in early recovery donors can start working 
alongside the state often through support to non-state actors, with a gradual 
transition to the state playing a greater role in service delivery‟ (Rose and Greeley 
2006:5). Programming in states with low capacity and high willingness may be more 
possible than in states that are „reticent, recalcitrant, or chronically unstable‟, but 
nevertheless requires grappling with sometimes messy and ambiguous political 
realities. Often there is no strong leadership championing reforms (Zivetz, 2006:3). 
Technocratic approaches are undermined where there is lack of will for engagement. 
„Sophisticated strategies to improve the relationship between state regulators and 
private providers have little relevance where the government is repressive or lacking 
commitment to poverty reduction goals‟ (Berry, 2004:7). 
 
With regard to engagement with non-state actors in service delivery, the willingness 
and capacity of the state to perform the indirect roles may be weak or absent, but the 
impact of fragility and/or conflict on services means the need for prioritisation, 
coordination and leadership may be great.  The impacts of conflict and fragility on 
services are widely documented, and include deteriorated infrastructures, lack of 
trained and skilled technical personnel, weak information and management systems, 
severe financial constraints, and distorted or broken lines of accountability. In post-
conflict environments, the systematic exclusion of certain groups further undermines 
service provision premised on norms of universality, equity and participation 
(Pavanello, 2008:10). Where the state has been weak or absent and services are 
predominantly delivered through small-scale „for profit providers‟, households, 
community organisations, relief or humanitarian INGOs and NGOs, the potential for 
fragmentation presents a major co-ordination challenge. The state, civil society and 
the international community must arguably move into much tighter forms of collective 
action to meet these challenges (Wood, 2008).  
 
The OECD DAC (2008) concludes that state fragility inevitably reduces the role of the 
state in favour of non-state actors. A legacy of state-avoidance strategies, particularly 
after a prolonged conflict, can embed a parallel structure in the service-delivery 
landscape, leaving the state relatively weak and under-resourced in favour of NGOs 
(Zivetz 2006:17). State legitimacy can also be weak compared to non-state actors - 
for example in Papua New Guinea, where church organisations are major service 
providers and are accorded stronger legitimacy and recognition than state actors 
(Hauck et al. 2005, cited in Brinkerhoff, 2007). Studies in Mozambique demonstrate 
how such imbalance can fuel resentment on the part of the state towards NSPs 
(Pavignani and Colombo, 2001). Another key concern is loss of government control 
over core issues of quality and access to services.  NSP predominance may also 
weaken links of accountability by government to citizens, especially where donors 
are funding non-state organisations directly (OECD 2008:30 and 34). Concerns 
about accountability and state legitimacy are central to the notion of service delivery 
as a form of state building. The delivery of services is seen as an important catalyst 
for longer-term pro-poor social, economic and political change, and for reducing the 
sources of fragility (for example, social exclusion) (USAID, 2005; Meagher, 2005), 
also for avoiding „backsliding‟ (USAID, 2005).   
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There is little disagreement that responding to the immediate needs of the population 
takes priority over actions to build government capacity where the state is a weak or 
non-existent partner, but debates arise regarding how to do the former without doing 
damage to the latter (Brinkerhoff, 2008). Studies have shown there has been 
insufficient attention to re-establishing government capacity for service delivery in 
post-conflict environments. This can reinforce, rather than remedy, the fragmentation 
of services. But as Brinkerhoff (2007) notes, capacity development efforts are likely 
to be more difficult in fragile states where societies have been fragmented by 
deteriorating or conflict conditions, and where trust and tolerance levels tend to be 
lower.  Whilst the extent of residual capacity will necessarily vary between and within 
fragile contexts - the degree to which state functions remain intact is one aspect of 
this, another is the level of human capital remaining (e.g. the numbers of health 
workers in place) (Pavignani and Colombo, 2001) - fragile states are commonly 
characterised by lack of basic capability to self-organise and act to establish 
supportive relationships and to achieve policy coherence (Brinkerhoff, 2007).  
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2. Relationships between state and non-state actors in service 
provision 
Forms of engagement  
On a scale from more direct to more indirect state provision of basic services, the 
state‟s possible roles might go as follows: 
1. State provides all aspects of a service including delivery to consumers 
2. State is the main provider of a service, but there is also NSP competition and 
choice 
3. State contracts in NSP to provide support inputs to state provision 
4. State contracts out and finances direct provision by NSP  
5. NSP operates as the main provider but within a framework of rules set by the 
state: 
I. Setting standards and regulating NSP 
II. Making policy frameworks and standards 
 
Balabanova et al (2008) group and elaborate points 3-5 into the following main 
categories:  
– Financing: Contracting and franchising NSP, subsidies to consumers and 
providers, vouchers; contracting in private finance for public services 
– Regulating: Setting minimum standards and enforcing them, licensing, 
accrediting, promoting self-regulation, safeguarding consumers 
– Stewardship: Formulating policies and strategies, involving non-state actors in 
deciding policy objectives, providing information to users and providers, 
monitoring needs, performance and outcomes 
 
This broadly corresponds to the main types of engagement set out in section 3 of this 
report: policy environment and dialogue, regulation and facilitation, contracting, and 
mutual and informal agreements. It is important to point out that some of these –
particularly the policy environment and regulation – open up some very general 
issues about governmental and legal processes that go well beyond a particular 
focus on state-NSP relations in specific sectors.6  
 
The technical case for state intervention 
The motives for state intervention may provide some guidance about which of these 
modalities is appropriate. In practice, motives are complex, diverse, and driven more 
by historical evolution, ideologies, power relations and the capacity of public and 
private agencies than by technical considerations. However, it may be useful for 
donors and governments considering how to work with non-state providers in 
particular sectors and contexts to assess the technical case for state intervention and 
what this implies for the level and form of engagement. Earlier papers, including 
some of the contributions to OECD fragile states discussion, use this sort of analysis 
(Besley 2007, Picciotto 1997, Batley 1996, USAID 2005, World Bank 2004, Commins 
2006).7  Some elements of the argument are useful for consideration of the empirical 
evidence. 
 
                                                 
6
 Given the limits of the study, we have maintained a tight focus. For example, we distinguish „policy dialogue‟ from 
discussion in post-conflict situations between humanitarian relief agencies, donors and government about the 
integration of relief services. Policy dialogue implies a relationship with actors who retain a long term presence in the 
policy arena. 
7
 A separate guidance paper could be written on this subject, setting out an approach to analysing service 
characteristics and contexts, and their implications for forms of regulation and service delivery. 
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The services considered in this paper - primary health-care, primary education, and 
basic water supply and sanitation - are predominantly „private goods‟ at the point of 
delivery. In economic terms, private goods are ones that private actors are willing to 
provide because they can charge for them, since non-payers are „excludable‟ and 
consumption is competitive („rivalrous‟). Nearest to „public goods‟ are drinking water 
from rivers, communal wells and public standpipes (non-excludable, and non-
rivalrous except in drought) and piped water and sewerage (excludable but non-
rivalrous).  But basic water and sanitation systems in developing countries often have 
more private characteristics – water vending, latrines, household waste-water into 
streets). The fact that non-state provision is abundant in most developing countries is 
evidence of the „private goods‟ status of these services. This means that, for these 
basic services, government has the options of  
- providing the service directly;  
- contracting non-state actors to provide the service; 
- acting as steward and regulator of NSP. 
 
In addition to the role of directly delivering services, there are public goods aspects of 
the provision of all of these services: these are essentially the „backroom‟ functions of 
supporting, coordinating and regulating within and between services: e.g. setting 
policy frameworks, enforcing standards, establishing common school curricula and 
exams, ensuring universal take-up of basic services, training staff, building mains 
pipelines, and ensuring the standards of drugs. For particular services, there are 
specific reasons why governments (or local governments and community 
organisations) would assume these stewardship and regulatory roles, and perhaps 
also advance into financing, contracting and direct provision: 
- Health-care (but also other forms of professional service including 
education) is particularly associated with problems of information 
asymmetry, where consumers are unable to judge the quality of the 
service, may be misled by professionals, or choose less effective 
services. 
- Education provided only with regard to individual benefits will fail to 
realise the wider benefits (positive externalities) associated with a 
universally educated population, including the nation-building that may 
result from a common syllabus and identity. Of all the services 
examined here, it is the one most often associated with the call for 
direct state provision (Rose and Greeley 2006:4). 
- Clean water and sanitation are associated with the positive 
externalities (health and environment) that accrue to the whole 
population as a result of extending consumption to others. 
- Finally, all these services have „merit goods‟ characteristics, meaning 
that government intervention may be necessary to get people to 
consume „what is in their own best interests‟, regardless of their own 
preferences. (Stiglitz, 2000) Moreover, „left to itself the market will 
serve only those who have purchasing power‟ (Besley, 2007), implying 
the case for subsidised public or private provision.  
 
The technical case for intervention takes us only so far. There is a major question 
about the capacity of governments to take on not only the direct provider roles but 
perhaps especially the indirect roles. The indirect roles imply a need for willingness 
and capacity to choose among competing objectives; define objectives for service 
provision; set standards, criteria, and output targets; and safeguard the broader 
public interest. (Rondinelli, 2006:28). Compared with direct service provision, these 
roles require different capacities to be performed effectively (Batley and Larbi, 2004). 
They necessarily involve multiple actors, complex interrelationships, and 
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collaboration (Balabanova, 2007) – and therefore require „relational‟ capacity to 
strategise, regulate and coordinate with non-state actors (Robinson, 2008: 573).  
 
„Evidence on government failure is fairly compelling‟ (Besley, 2007). A comparative 
study of the performance of indirect provider roles in a number of non-fragile 
developing countries (Ghana, Zimbabwe, South Africa, India, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, 
Thailand, Argentina and Venezuela) found that the conditions for the performance of 
these roles were exacting and that they were usually poorly performed (Batley and 
Larbi, 2004). Especially in the spheres of education and health, due to their 
qualitative nature and multiple objectives, there is difficulty in specifying contract 
requirements, gathering information, assessing performance, and enforcing 
standards through regulation and contracts. 
 
Non-state provision and the context for relationships with the state 
Systematic information on the scale of non-state provision is not available, given that 
much of it is unregistered, unregulated and unnoticed. But there are estimates from 
some countries – though the figures are rarely comparable. DFID-funded research in six 
countries of Africa and South Asia8, drawing on a wide survey of the available literature 
found that the non-state sector (including small entrepreneurs, voluntary 
organisations and NGOs, traditional providers, faith-based and community 
organisations) is large and sometimes dominant, particularly in the health, water and 
sanitation sectors. Though this study did not cover post-conflict states, it is the only 
one we know of that has compared non-state provision and the history of 
relationships across several countries and across the three sectors that are the topic 
of this paper. 
 
In Nigeria and Malawi, Christian medical missions provide around 60 percent and 37 
percent of health-care services respectively, and in addition there is a myriad of for-
profit providers. Faith-based organisations own the majority of schools in Malawi, 
although most are funded by the state and are closely integrated into the public 
system. In Nigeria, mission schools were taken over by the state in the 1970s. 
Private for-profit schools are important in both countries, attend the needs of low-
income as well as high income groups, and are growing. In Malawi, they account for 
about four percent of primary and 40 percent of secondary schools; in Nigeria, the 
registered for-profit sector accounts for 20 percent of primary schools in some states 
but there is a huge unknown, unregistered category, said to account for about 40 
percent of the children in school in Lagos. Water and sanitation are formally provided 
by the state, but in both countries the majority of the rural population depends largely 
on household and community provision while, outside the large cities, the majority or 
the urban population depend on water tankers, vendors or private boreholes. 
 
The South Asian countries present a similar pattern with a particular predominance of 
NSP in the health sector. Over 80% of Pakistani households use private health 
practitioners (a third of whom are unqualified); in Bangladesh, the proportion is 88 
percent. In India, although there is great variation between states, 80 percent of 
qualified allopathic doctors and 57 percent of hospitals operate privately, and non-
allopathic medicine is almost entirely private. In all three countries the proportions 
using private health and education services is growing. In Pakistan and Bangladesh9, 
20-25% of total school enrolment is in non-state schools, with the proportion in 
                                                 
8
 This section is mainly based on research reported in articles by Batley, Palmer, Rose and Sansom (all 2004)  based 
on research data at http://www.idd.bham.ac.uk/research/Service_Providers.shtml#study and 
http://www.idd.bham.ac.uk/research/Service_Providers.shtml#Whose 
9
 Aliya madrasas account for 30% of secondary education students in Bangladesh (Bano 2008) 
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Pakistan reaching 35% in the case of primary schools (Andrabi et al 2006). In 
Bangladesh, most non-state enrolment is in state-assisted community and faith 
schools with teachers‟ salaries paid by government. As in the African countries, the 
majority of the rural population and around a third of the population of the larger cities 
do not have access to public piped water, but depend on private water vendors or on 
tube-wells managed by households, communities, NGOs or government agencies. 
According to the Pakistan Integrated Household Survey, 61 percent of all water 
systems are self-financed by individual households.10 
 
Whereas NSP in water and sanitation is largely for the poor and for areas beyond the 
reach of public systems, non-state health and education services address a broader 
span of consumers. Non-state health services are probably as likely to serve the poor 
as the rich; in Pakistan, even the most „vulnerable‟ population was as likely as the 
better-off to use private health-care but less likely to use non-state schools. In 
Nigeria, Malawi, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, although government remains the 
main provider of primary education to all groups including the poor, non-state 
schools, particularly the unregistered ones, also serve poor families (Rose 2006, 
Rose and Greeley, and, specifically on Pakistan, Andrabi et al 2006). 
 
It is clear that NSP offers a spectrum of services in terms of quality. However, it is 
wrong to assume that the poor choose non-state provision simply for want of access 
to public services. Surveys in Pakistan have found that users report dissatisfaction 
with government services and greater satisfaction with non-state provision of 
healthcare, education and water supply (CIET 2003 and Planning Commission 
2003). A report for Enugu State in Nigeria showed that non-state health services 
were preferred because they were often more convenient, more considerate and 
cheaper (McClean and Salui 2003); similar findings come from a survey of traditional 
birth attendants in Malawi (Lule and Ssembatya 1994).  
 
There is a great variety of types of provider. Individual entrepreneurs operate in 
health, education, water and sanitation, and are often the most abundant but least 
known category. Faith-based organisations and NGOs appear as direct providers in 
health and education, but very rarely in water supply except as facilitators - though 
there is a church-based water and sanitation system in Malawi. Community and 
household provision is most prevalent in water and sanitation, although community 
organisations often also act as funders and managers of schools.  
 
Even this categorisation of NSP organisations describes only the tip of the iceberg of 
organisational variety. First, the categories are not wholly distinct; in particular, there 
are often very blurred boundaries between state and non-state providers – the same 
professional practitioners frequently operate in both sectors, standing in the way of 
transparent regulation and contracting (Mills et al 2001, Balabanova et al 2008). 
Second, broad categories such as „community organisation‟, „NGO‟, „FBO‟ and 
„entrepreneur‟ disguise the variety of organisational forms and capacities that they 
include, making it difficult to generalise policy for governments‟ relations with the non-
state sector. As already noted, even fragile states will have a residue of social and 
human capital which will affect the capacity to organise into businesses, CBOs and 
NGOs and the quality of their professionalism. OECD (2008b:26) suggests the pre-
conflict human capital of Iraq continued to exist (if it hadn‟t migrated) in conflict Iraq, 
though now unorganised – unlike Timor Leste where it was always weak. Robust 
states, such as India, may have dense NGO activity partly as a spill-over of the 
                                                 
10
 An Oxfam (2009) briefing paper argues that claims about the scale of private provision are over-stated but this is 
based on a view of „private‟ provision that includes only the formal private sector – e.g. clinics staffed by trained 
workers. 
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general level of the labour market, with sometimes higher levels of professionalism 
than can be found in state agencies (Nair 2007a:7-11). 
 
Most private, mainly small-scale, commercial providers operate independently from 
government, occupying the gaps and deficiencies in public services or competing 
with them, and trying to avoid state attention. In some cases, NGOs or voluntary 
associations have adopted the same go-it-alone strategy, often supported by donors: 
Bangladesh is well known as a country where parallel systems of service delivery 
developed in the 1980s and 90s. However, many service-delivery NGOs work in 
collaboration with government, either to improve public services or to complement 
them. The case for this sort of „partnership‟ is now widely promoted by donors and 
acknowledged, in principle, by governments and many NGOs (Bano, 2007; Nurul 
Alam, 2007; Nair, 2007a). 
 
Current attempts to forge relations between state and non-state providers are 
affected by layers of historical experience, in which donors have often played a 
significant part. Mistrust is often accompanied by a preference on both sides not to 
engage, at least formally. For governments, faced with the sheer scale and volume of 
non-state providers, „more often than not, turning a blind eye towards non-state 
providers may seem like the only rational alternative for overwhelmed systems‟ (Aga 
Khan, 2007:14). 
 
While there are elements in common in the state-NSP relationship, national histories 
are specific. For example, Bangladesh is characterised by its history of large scale 
NGO activity, and by a small number of very large NGOs that work across sectors 
and channel donor funding to smaller organisations, in systems that have a high 
degree of autonomy from government (Nurul Alam, 2007). In Malawi, large-scale 
mission hospital and school systems work closely with government while retaining 
some management autonomy (Kadzamira et al, 2004). In India, government has set 
the parameters of the relationship, incorporating and defining the role NGOs and the 
private sector, but with is greater variety of modes of action in different political 
territories and levels of government (Nair, 2007a). In Pakistan, commitment to 
partnership with NGOs and the private sector grew under donor influence and was 
consolidated under Musharraf‟s military government, at least partly as a way of 
bypassing the civil bureaucracy and provincial political leaders (Bano, 2007). 
Given the variety of historical experience leading to different structures of service 
delivery, the danger is of trying to bring about externally generated policy solutions 
that do not fit the context and which will therefore not endure. Policy choices are 
constrained (and supported) by the mix of service delivery models that are already in 
place, as Pavignani and Colombo (2008b) argue by reference to Afghanistan and 
Southern Sudan. In the latter, political, military and logistical factors determined the 
development of a rural health service that was fragmented, heavily dependent on 
NGO provision and with weak links to the urban-based tertiary hospitals.  
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3. Lessons from the exercise of state roles  
 
This section draws on the available case study material on government-NSP 
engagement in fragile and conflict-affected states and low capacity settings to identify 
the factors which have influenced state effectiveness in stewarding, regulating, 
facilitating and financing the non-state sector. In particular, how have levels of state 
capacity affected (enabled or constrained) the possibilities for successful 
collaboration? What capacity may be needed in order for the state to perform the 
indirect roles effectively? As indicated in section 1, under „capacity‟ we include 
organisational and wider institutional factors, as well as the connections between the 
actors, including government, state agencies, NSPs and donors.  
 
The experience of government-NSP engagement is presented in four areas: 1) Policy 
environment and dialogue; 2) Regulation and facilitation; 3) Contracting and 4) 
Informal and mutual agreements. It should be noted that due to the limited case 
study material, the evidence presented here is only indicative of the issues that may 
enable or constrain state effectiveness. As noted above, in identifying case material 
we have had to focus on experiences of engagement that deal directly with service 
delivery. Also, we have drawn on some non-fragile states for material, not simply 
faute de mieux but because if in those contexts constraints and poor performance of 
roles are significant they are likely to be even more so in fragile states. 
 
Whilst measuring the impact of the different forms of engagement in improving 
service standards and strengthening accountability is not the focus of this report, 
these are important considerations in determining what constitutes a „successful 
engagement‟. Such assessment is included here to the extent that it is evident in the 
case studies. Another aspect of „successful engagement‟ illustrated where possible is 
the question whether and to what extent the exercise of state roles is more or less 
pro-poor. 
 
Policy environment and dialogue 
Non-state providers need a stable and predictable policy environment in which to 
operate (WHO, 2005). Government should in principle take responsibility for defining 
policy goals, and for leading the process of consultation, gathering information on 
needs and possible outcomes, priority setting and planning in relation to service 
delivery (Balabanova et al, 2008:22). These activities set the rules of engagement 
between government and NSPs and enable the more active roles of dialogue, 
regulation, and contracting.   
 
But the policy continuity required for the development of long-term relationships may 
be absent in fragile and conflict-affected settings. Studies in Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
Nigeria and Malawi demonstrate that „the environment of non-state provision is 
typically one of policy unreliability and legal instability. The relationship is frequently 
beset by ambivalence and mutual mistrust, built on histories of policy change and 
rivalry. Underlying this is a real struggle for territory and for the control of scarce 
financial resources.‟ (Batley, 2006:243). Nigeria and Pakistan, for example, have 
seen historical lurches from state takeover, to severe public service decline, through 
the incremental growth of market provision, to the advocacy of partnership (Larbi et 
al 2004). A recent report from an Asian Development Bank programme to improve 
relations between the government of Pakistan and NGOs concluded that confidence 
and continuity in policy and practice required „suitable legislation that grasps the 
ethos of …engagement allowing the Government to look upon NGOs as allies, while 
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NGOs engage with Government without expectations of patronage or fear of 
coercion‟ (ADB, 2008:11).11  
 
Donors can facilitate dialogue which seeks to build credibility, recognition and 
understanding of the capacity of the non-state sector, and to identify avenues for 
further collaboration (ADB, 2008). The aim of this level of dialogue is often to find 
complementarities between the roles of government and NSPs (Wakefield, 2004). 
But government agencies may be reluctant openly to recognise the existence of 
NSPs (with the implication that the state alone cannot provide adequate services) 
which can preclude real engagement (Sansom, 2006). Even where the principle of 
partnership with NGOs is formally espoused, the practice is often very different. 
There is limited evidence to indicate that government engagement with NSPs in the 
education sector has resulted in government actually accommodating the views of 
non-state actors, for example (Rose, 2007). In post-conflict Mozambique, certain 
NGOs did engage in dialogue with government through a donor-supported „co-
ordination scheme‟, but in reality policy was made behind closed doors (Pavignani 
and Durão, 1999). 
 
Formal policy dialogue may require organisational capacity not present either in the 
non-state or public sector. The advent of increasingly formalised policy dialogue in 
Malawi has placed demands on NGOs that they are largely unable to meet, with the 
exception of a few large „representative‟ NGOs (ActionAid, 2008). Government 
capacity to create and maintain institutional spaces to sustain dialogue (e.g. a unit 
and or an advisory board) are often constrained by shortage of trained human 
resources that can lead and manage a meaningful collaboration. In post-conflict 
Uganda, for example, both lack of skill and willingness to engage with mission health 
facilities at sub-national level was evident (Balabanova et al, 2008). In this case, the 
capacity of the non-state sector to better organise and represent itself through the 
development of „bureaus‟ was key to enabling dialogue with government 
(Seengooba, Bataringaya and Kirunga, cited in Balabanova et al, 2008: 34) 
 
Even where formal dialogue does take place, it can be harmonious, adversarial or 
non-existent, depending in part on historical circumstances (Moran, 2006). It is often 
restricted to the policy design stage in „set-piece events‟ rather than in continuous 
interaction over policy implementation, and it can often involve NSPs only very 
cursorily. Government often choose to engage with the larger and more formal NGOs 
who, as indicated above, may be the only types with the requisite capacity to 
represent themselves, and may not necessarily be service delivery organisations. 
The result is that dialogue may rule out important service delivery organisations 
made up of small, informal NSPs. A World Bank study of the health sector in 
Bangladesh observed that: „alternative private providers have very little interaction 
with government. Thus, public-private engagement has largely excluded service 
providers of greatest importance to the poor‟ (World Bank 2003 cited in Chowdhury 
et al 2004). In Nigeria, umbrella organisations or associations have sought to 
influence government on behalf of their members, often with the aim of challenging 
restrictive government practices. These associations tend to favour more established 
NSPs serving elite populations (Larbi et al, 2004). Accordingly, governments‟ ability 
to resist pressure from particular non-state providers is an aspect of capacity that 
may be needed for governments to protect the public interest (Balabanova et al, 
2008:28).  
                                                 
11
 This programme aimed at strengthening collaboration and engagement between government and NGOs in 
general, although an aspect of this was relations with NSPs. See the full report at: 
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/Consultant/33080-PAK/33080-PAK-TACR.PDF 
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In post-conflict situations, Pavignani and Colombo (2008a) describe the dangers of 
premature pressure by international agencies on national governments (Kosovo, 
Liberia and Angola) to formulate comprehensive health policies before capacity and 
information are in place. In Liberia and Angola this was compounded by competing 
donor-supported processes towards health policy formulation. Moreover, NGOs „who 
usually know better what happens in reality…. are usually absent from the „high‟ 
policy discussion‟ in these countries‟.12 In practice, governments of „disrupted health 
sectors‟ are not able even to assemble information about the activities of NGOs, as a 
basis for coordinated action (ibid:19). The exclusion of private providers from routine 
information systems hinders the scope of government planning (Balabanova et al, 
2008:38). 
 
Spaces for formal dialogue become more harmonized with the advent of PRSPs and 
Sector Wide Approaches (SWAps), influenced by donors, including in post-conflict 
states such as Mozambique, Liberia and Rwanda (Pavignani and Colombo, 2008a). 
A USAID study of PRSPs in 21 African countries shows that they did include 
consultation with the private sector; however, non-state providers of social services 
were rarely involved – Rwanda was an exception (Fox, 2004). Sector level dialogue 
is likely to engage more directly with service providers. The Health SWAp in 
Bangladesh is noted as providing the opportunity for policy dialogue between state 
and NSP and as an opportunity for donors to highlight the need for greater and more 
effective public engagement with the non state sector (Chowdhury et al, 2004). The 
Education For All initiative is an example of how: „international commitments can 
afford legitimacy to countries from the international community providing them with 
opportunities to benefit from increased aid…which, in turn, can enhance capacity to 
fulfil their commitments.‟ (Rose, 2006:5) But „the slow, patient, inclusive negotiations 
leading to a SWAp in a stable health sector are out of place in an unstable one‟ 
(Pavignani, 2008b:62).   
 
Informal dialogue between government and NSPs may be more prevalent in low 
capacity settings than formal dialogue - because the formal frameworks are not in 
place and more informal, local dialogue may require less capacity. A successful 
example of local level engagement and dialogue in the education sector in Somalia is 
cited by Rose. Here, NGOs initiated the engagement by inviting local government 
staff to training and presentations; and regional education bureaus have been set up 
in some areas to review alternative basic education programmes. „Government direct 
involvement of this kind can help in learning of lessons directly from NGO 
innovations, while understanding the constraints they face‟ (Rose, 2007:40). A similar 
low-key („soft, consensual and voluntary‟) model of coordination and dialogue 
between donors, UN agencies and NGOs supporting the Somali health sector is 
described by Pavignani (2008:8)13. Dialogue such as this, at the operational level, is 
seen by Batley (2006:250) as important because this is where the history of distrust 
and rivalry frustrates policy implementation. He goes on to argue that there is in 
practice a good deal of informal, local-level interaction between officials and non-
state service deliverers but that it is not perceived as policy dialogue, is rarely 
transparent, and is often about doing deals about special privileges (for, example the 
protection of water truckers‟ control of the market in Lagos and Karachi). 
 
                                                 
12
 Enrico Pavignani, private communication 7 February 2009 
13
 The Health Steering Committee of the Somalia Aid Coordination Body, based in Nairobi 
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Regulation and facilitation 
The objective of regulation is that services be provided in an efficient, fair and 
sustainable manner, whilst bearing in mind social priorities set out by policy makers 
(both at national and local government level) (International Water Center, 2008). 
Regulation forms the basis on which non-state service providers are prohibited, 
permitted or encouraged to operate. It can, on one hand, seek to suppress non-state 
activity or, on the other, to promote its more efficient operation. Regulation can take 
the form of „command and control‟ approaches (e.g. registration) or „regulation by 
facilitation‟, which involves the use of incentives (e.g. payment or inputs such as 
training and equipment) in return for compliance with required standards (Palmer, 
2006). But if, as Pavignani (2008c:17) argues, „the difficulty of enforcing regulatory 
measures increases with the time they remained neglected‟, then the challenge of 
regulation in weak and fragile settings may be particularly acute. 
 
Regulation is an inherently political activity, difficult to practise in contested situations 
where regulators may lack adequate incentives or political clout. Weak and contested 
public authorities are not in the position of enforcing legislation, assuming legislation 
exists. „Unsurprisingly, public authorities in many cases prefer to drop the issue from 
the policy agenda, and concentrate on service provision‟ (Pavignani, 2008c:17). Even 
in relatively strong states, there is evidence that capacity to regulate successfully - 
particularly in relation to enforcement and monitoring - has been weak. Balabanova 
et al (2008:29) cite the case of the failure on the part of Indian government to 
regulate the private health sector through Consumer Forums. Here, in spite of 
comprehensive legal instruments being in place, the ability of government to enforce 
the law and deal with public demand for legal services is weak. The 2004 DFID-
funded study of non-state providers found that cases of effective (pro-service) 
regulation were likely to occur where the regulator had information, was capable of 
enforcing standards, had no incentive to repress non-state providers, and where 
providers have incentives to comply (Batley 2006, Palmer 2006, Rose 2006). Efforts 
to strengthen regulatory capacity should therefore arguably focus on implementation, 
rather than on legislative and procedural issues (Pavignani, 2008c:17). 
 
A key concern with regulation is that it may not be focused on the providers that are 
most important to the poor. In Bangladesh, for instance, the focus has been on 
undertaking and enforcing the registration of doctors. In contrast, the government 
had not (in 2006) yet begun to intervene to regulate the unqualified providers in the 
private sector, even though these were the most important providers for the poor 
(Chowdhury et al, 2006). Information on small-scale, informal non-state providers is 
often severely lacking, probably especially in fragile settings.  Establishing or 
applying a regulatory framework on informal markets is extremely difficult. „The 
scattered nature of small scale health providers makes traditional monitoring (e.g. in 
terms of visits or inspections) a formidable challenge‟ (Palmer, 2006:235). 
Instruments to regulate this sector are likely to be of an indirect or informal nature, 
and should begin with bringing these activities into the open (Pavignani, 2008c:17). 
In Mozambique, for example, government is planning to overcome lack of capacity to 
regulate informal providers by first identifying key aspects of service performance at 
the local level that should be monitored, and then using community committees to 
carry out the monitoring (Trémolet, 2006). Making data on the performance of 
providers publicly available mobilises the regulatory effects of reputation (Trémolet 
and Browning 2002). 
 
Regulation, as practised, normally seeks to place controls on „entry‟ into the market.  
This can often take the form of elaborate and highly bureaucratised registration 
schemes that place an enormous burden on the capacity of the regulator and can be 
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prohibitively cumbersome or expensive for NSPs.14 These „command and control‟ 
types of regulation can have an intrusive intent and rarely set a practicable basis on 
which standards of operation can be assessed. Command and control regulation 
tends to focus on monitoring inputs and restricting competition, rather than on the 
quality of outputs. In education in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, for example, less 
attention has been paid to monitoring the quality and accessibility of non-government 
schools than on registering them and restricting competition (e.g. non-state schools 
must maintain a certain distance from or get the permission of government schools). 
Entry based regulations are often not, in practice, applied because regulatory 
organisations lack staff, skills, enforcement powers, or information on the sector to be 
regulated, or because NSPs avoid them and prefer to remain unrecognised (Mills et 
al 2001). An example is the Liberian pharmaceutical sector, where a combination of 
lack of commitment and political will to enforce the laws; together with a considerable 
number of conflicts between vested interests over a period of years have resulted in 
regulations and policies that are confused and contradictory, and unclear allocation 
of responsibility for implementation and enforcement (Osmond, O‟Connell and 
Bunting, 2007). 
 
Negative, anti-competitive regulation seems most likely to occur where there is a 
direct government service to protect (Batley, 2006). Double standards, whereby the 
government asks private operators to abide by quality requirements far beyond those 
attained in public facilities, are common in weak and disrupted health systems. 
Where the public sector is competing with private providers for resources and 
customers, conflicts of interest arise (Pavignani, 2008c:17). Cross-overs of 
employment between the public and private sectors may further undermine 
willingness to regulate. Regulatory capture, in which the regulated exert undue 
influence on the regulatory process, occurred in the case of the Health Professionals 
Council in (pre-crisis) Zimbabwe. In this case, not only were resources for inspection 
scarce, but there was also dominance of the medical profession among the 
regulators. There were also problems of weak regulatory design, outdated legislation, 
inadequate price and quality regulatory mechanisms, and unclear procedures for 
processing consumer complaints (Hongoro and Kumaranayake 2000 in Mills et al 
2002). Regulatory agencies that are semi-autonomous from government are rare in 
low capacity settings. One successful example is the National Agency for Food and 
Drug Administration and Control in Nigeria. This agency requires drug vendors to sit 
an exam to obtain a license, and for products to be registered (Palmer, 2006). 
However, in this case the head of the agency was eventually removed from office 
after receiving threats. 
 
Government regulation may be more desirable and effective when it is slimmed down 
and re-directed from the control of service inputs to monitoring and supporting the 
quality of outputs. This essentially means (i) stripping down the amount of procedural 
(input based) rules and (ii) replacing them with incentives – i.e. output or outcome 
performance measures for which they are rewarded. Lighter touch approaches to 
regulation can allow for the regulator to be divorced at least partly from the interests 
of the providers and also the predatory interest of government (Batley, 2006). An 
example of incentive- based regulation is the Government of Malawi‟s attempt to 
improve the quality of services delivered by traditional birth attendants by providing 
basic training and equipment and through the promotion of accreditation. But in this 
case, supervision was minimal because the task fell to district nurses who were 
already overloaded (Palmer, 2006). Incentive-based regulation can also take the 
form of the provision of vouchers which can only be used with accredited providers. A 
                                                 
14
 For example, in Nigeria, schools have to register with the Environment Agency, Ministry of Health, Fire Brigade, 
and Water Corporation, each of which requires a registration fee – see Rose, 2007. 
 23 
successful example of this is the use of vouchers for antenatal care and delivery to 
pregnant women in Bangladesh (Palmer, 2006).  
 
Substitutes for state regulation may be more effective; these include self-
accreditation, franchise and community oversight, but there is limited evidence of 
their application in fragile settings. NGO accreditation has been applied by the 
Pakistan Centre for Philanthropy to set standards of good internal governance, 
transparent financial management and effective programme delivery assessed by an 
independent panel. In Azad Jammu Kashmir, Social Marketing Pakistan has 
franchised private clinics and pharmacies which have the right to use the „Green Star‟ 
franchise brand if they undergo training and maintain standards. This case suggests 
that national NGOs can act effectively as regulators of the quality of services 
provided by local level service deliverers. In some cases, communities or client-users 
have become part of the process of regulation and monitoring of the performance of 
service providers supporting the „short-route of accountability. A successful example 
of this is the BRAC model of community controlled schools (Rose, 2006). But self-
regulation will only work where providers are organized enough to collaborate and 
competitive enough to care about reputation. Client control depends on clients having 
the information to assess service quality, a basis of organisation and authority to 
assert their demands. In weak and fragile settings, these preconditions are likely to 
be absent. 
 
Contracting  
Contracting NSPs to deliver services (contracting out) or to support government 
delivery (contracting in) is increasingly viewed as an appropriate option, particularly 
in situations of high willingness and very low capacity (OECD-DAC, 2008:34). In 
some cases, it has been acknowledged as perhaps the only realistic option to 
support the wide scale restoration of services where there is no government capacity 
for direct provision.15 Another argument for contracting is that it frees up limited 
available government capacity to focus on the stewardship role (Zivetz, 2006; 
Balabanova et al, 2008). To the extent that contracting can set and enforce 
standards for the non-state sector, it can arguably address the potential for 
fragmentation, increase focus on measurable results, and encourage greater 
efficiency through competition (Loevinsohn, 2005:676). Where government retains a 
strategic space and a role in the allocation and monitoring of contracts, in principle it 
retains responsibility for the quality or delivery of services (Commins, 2006:23).  
 
But contracting requires organisational capacity in at least three areas: 1) design 
(writing contracts, specifying services and performance measures) 2) management 
(setting up administrative and financial systems) and 3) monitoring (time and 
resources to visit contracted out facilities) (Balabanova et al, 2008:42). Even where 
there is experience of contracting, contracts are often designed and managed poorly 
due to basic administrative failures and unclear roles and responsibilities (Batley and 
Larbi, 2004). Without a supportive external environment of public sector institutional 
rules, regulations, laws, policies, it is difficult for public sector organisations to 
maintain commitments and therefore difficult to gain the confidence of contractors. In 
fragile contexts, there can be profound cultural and institutional constraints in the 
form of social and political resistance to change and lack of adaptive capacity in the 
face of vested interests. Where governments cannot guarantee political or economic 
stability, or a legal system that would ensure contractual rights, there may be little 
prospect for formal contracting (Batley, 2006). Contracting may also require a strong 
                                                 
15
 Specifically, the adoption of national-scale health contracting in Afghanistan was seen as the only viable option 
because NGOs offered the only critical mass of capacity available to deliver services on this scale (Zivetz, 2006). 
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relational element: Recent ESRC-funded research in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh 
has shown that even where contractual relationships are formally hierarchical (the 
government paying – sometimes with donor funding – NGOs to produce a service) 
the agreements that were most effective were those that had a strong informal, 
relational element and which had grown out of earlier informal connections16.  
 
Capacity to design contractual requirements, assess bids, develop performance 
measures, and monitor contracts is likely to be weak or absent in fragile states.17 A 
key constraint is lack of information on the cost and quality of public and private 
service provision. The high profile case of large scale performance-based contracting 
for health in Afghanistan adopted a cost per capita approach, but concluded this was 
not a robust planning parameter: „In the early stages of reconstruction in a post-
conflict country…the lack of current data may make it necessary to take a pragmatic 
approach based on per capita costs until a better health management information 
system and better cost information are available‟ (Ameli and Newbrander, 2007:1).  
Monitoring has been problematic across a spectrum of forms of contracting and 
sectors (Mcloughlin, 2008). It is likely to be particularly difficult in highly politicised or 
conflicted settings (Carlson, 2007). Responsibility for contract monitoring can be 
contracted out to an international private firm, as was the case in Afghanistan, but 
even in this case, where technical capacity was is in place, specifying and monitoring 
contracts for the delivery of services in remote areas was challenging (Palmer, 
Strong, Wali, and Sondorp, 2006:720). Corruption can undermine public trust in the 
private sector if the contracting process is not transparent and carefully supervised. 
In Cambodia, the effectiveness of public-private partnerships has been hampered by 
the widespread lack of transparency; the government‟s failure to negotiate openly 
contracts and the tendency of government officials to bypass laws and administrative 
processes in awarding contracts (Rondinelli, 2006: 26). 
Different forms of contract require different levels of capacity on the part of 
government, as was found in a study of the contracting out of urban water supply and 
health-care in Africa and South Asia (Batley and Larbi, 2004). Short-term 'spot' 
contracts for one-off inputs (e.g. building works, or the supply of materials) are likely 
to be easier to design and manage; on the other hand they present transaction costs 
in the shape of frequent contracting and of the need to coordinate multiple 
contractors. Longer term and more complex arrangements, such as management 
contracts and concessions, have the advantage of wrapping all aspects of the 
service into one contract over a long period, potentially cutting transaction costs. On 
the other hand, the design of such contracts requires a great deal of information and 
experience to anticipate the relationships between all the elements of the service and 
to try to anticipate all the possible risks and uncertainties that may occur during the 
term of the contract. Because such complete knowledge does not exist, they are 
likely to depend on goodwill and trust between the partners to work out appropriate 
solutions over time. 
It cannot be assumed that there is the required capacity within the non-state sector, 
any more than in government, to enter into contractual agreements. Tight 
performance based contracts, in particular, may require a level of professional and 
organisational capacity (to negotiate contracts, estimate costs and consider terms, 
fulfil reporting requirements and meet deadlines) that may rule out the local and 
informal providers that are often most important to poorer people. The scale of the 
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 http://www.idd.bham.ac.uk/research/Service_Providers.shtml#Whose 
17
 We should not, however, conclude that bad contract management precludes the delivery of effective services by 
NGOs under contract: Loevinsohn and Harding‟s (2005: 679) influential study of contracting for health service 
delivery found that „even in cases where contract management was not done well, contractors were still successful in 
delivering large-scale programmes‟.  
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contracts being offered may also be prohibitive to NGOs. In Sudan, for example, 
NGOs have been unwilling, or unable, to take on contracts for the delivery of health 
services in entire provinces. Here, the Ministry of Health is now looking to revise the 
contract terms of reference so they are more appealing to NGOs (Carlson, 2007:18). 
NGOs may be unwilling to enter into contracts with government for other reasons, 
including weak financial incentives, lack of trust in government generally and 
confidence in their ability to pay (Mcloughlin, 2008). Tight, formal contracts may be 
particularly difficult for NGOs (by comparison with the private commercial sector) to 
comply with for reasons of organisational capacity and identity. Small NGOs may 
lack necessary accounting capacity and be unwilling to see themselves as agents of 
government, displacing their independent perceptions of the means and ends of 
public policy18. 
 
There is some evidence that formal contracting is increasingly taking the place of 
loose, relational agreements. For example, mission health facilities in Zimbabwe, 
Uganda, Tanzania, Uganda and Papua New Guinea have historically operated on 
the basis of missionary funding but as this source declined, they have been either 
taken over or part-funded by governments.19 The relationship was initially on the 
basis of trust with no formal agreement. More recently some (e.g. in Papua New 
Guinea and Malawi) have entered into 'service agreements' with government, 
providing specified services in return for payment and within the framework of 
government policy.  In Malawi, agreements moved from unwritten understandings to 
written MOUs, and from 2004 to formal service agreements. These were designed to 
clarify the terms on which government funding was given and thereby to relieve 
growing distrust suspicion about the fulfilment of obligations, sources and amounts of 
funding, and the relative benefits of government and CHAM officials. Within the 
framework of the service agreement, the managerial autonomy of hospitals to decide 
how they organise to deliver the service is protected by the fact that they negotiate 
collectively through their association (Green et al, 2002; Kadzamira et al, 2004). 
 
Large-scale, formal (performance-based) contracting has been successful where it 
has relied on heavy donor financial and technical support. This approach, modelled 
on experience in Cambodia and Bangladesh, is a form of contracting increasingly 
being replicated in other fragile states, including Sudan and Liberia (Palmer, Strong, 
Wali, and Sondorp, 2006:718)  A key factor influencing the success of this approach 
has been donor harmonisation and alignment. 20 But questions remain about the 
long-term feasibility and high costs of large-scale contracting.21 In Liberia, 
government has been concerned about entering into contracts in the absence of 
guaranteed, long-term donor funding (Carlson, 2007). There is also debate about the 
impact of this approach on the capacitation of the state. In the Afghanistan case, 
Zivetz observes „local health offices have little in the way of capacity, and resources 
flow directly to NGOs from Kabul. NGO salaries are higher and more reliable than 
government salaries, facilities where staff are only receiving government salaries 
were found to be largely non-functional…It is not surprising that local health 
departments find it difficult to exert their own authority in this situation‟ (Zivetz, 
2006:18).  
 
Conversely, contracting may build the capacity of the state for planning at the central 
level: The experience of contracting may have wider benefits on the policy and 
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 http://www.idd.bham.ac.uk/research/Service_Providers.shtml#Whose 
19
 Mission hospitals are important providers, offering between 45-50% of health care services in Zimbabwe, 
Tanzania, Uganda and Papua New Guinea, and 35% in Malawi and Zambia. 
20
 The Afghanistan model is now, in turn, likely to be replicated in other fragile settings (email from Clare Lockhart, 
Institute for State Effectiveness, 19.01.09) 
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regulatory processes. It can make government more conscious of its policy priorities 
and clearer about the standards against which it regulates providers. Contracts have 
the benefit of requiring a clearer specification of expectations and of providing a basis 
for monitoring of performance. (Batley and Larbi 2004:176; Mills et al, 2001). For 
example, in Afghanistan, a balanced scorecard approach to monitoring NGOs has 
been effective in identifying priority areas for improvement and in measuring 
performance over time (Hansen, 2008:107). 
 
There are successful cases of small scale contracting at the local level which may 
occur more sporadically, may be less resource-intensive, and may allow a more 
incremental approach to the development of contracting capacity. An example is the 
relationship between the district health board and faith based hospitals in Enugu 
State, Nigeria. In this pilot case, government recognised that Enugu had no district 
hospital, so agreed to heavily subsidise selected faith based hospitals to provide 
emergency obstetric care for women. The evaluation of the pilot - which was 
supported by DFID - noted that a key to success was the fact that the State Health 
Board devolved responsibility for the scheme to district level. The report concludes 
that these small scale practical examples provide government with some experience 
to build on, and that this model would be simple to replicate where there are other 
gaps in government services (PATHS, 2008:98).  
 
Contracts for non-state providers often include „transition planning‟ for hand-back of 
functions to government (OECD DAC, 2008). Even where donors are funding NSPs 
directly, not through government, contracts for NSPs can require NGOs to contribute 
to long-term government policy and prepare for hand-back. An example is the Basic 
Services Fund in Southern Sudan, which requires NSP projects to systematically 
gather and analyse relevant project information for the benefit of future service 
delivery policies, programmes and projects and to support State and County level 
capacity building training and lesson learning (Mott McDonald, 2008:7). However, a 
recent evaluation found that whilst most NGO exit strategies assume a handover to 
government ministries - through training of government staff, establishment of 
community structures to oversee them, phasing out NGO incentives and handing 
over staff to government payroll - there were almost no instances where this had 
actually occurred. Ministries are simply in no position to take over staff. Contact 
between NGOs and government was at the level of information-sharing and 
consultation rather than co-planning, with the result that there was little sense of 
government ownership. The report recommends a „learning by doing‟ approach that 
combines increased lesson-learning and a clearer role in directing programme 
implementation for the Southern Sudan Government to fulfil the potential of the 
programme to build the capacity of the state (Morton, 2008). 
 
A rare example of where contracting has supported the capacitation of the state for 
direct service provision is Timor Leste, where government contracted NSPs on a 
short term basis requiring them to design district health plans and build the capacity 
of government health staff to take over. This, combined with separate capacity 
building at the government level, rapidly phased out NGO provision in favour of 
government provision. But certain attributes of the context of post-conflict Timor 
Leste may arguably have predisposed it to an early phase-out strategy. These 
included a relatively stable government and a cohesive society (Alonso, 2006). Also, 
some have argued that the rapid downsizing of the NGO sector may have been 
precipitous (Zivetz, 2006:24).  
 
Contracting does not necessarily preclude state building, but there is a risk that it can 
(Eldon, 2008). The type of institutional arrangement for contracting is a key factor in 
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this debate. In stabilising contexts, where there is some will, partner country 
government ministries have been active participants in planning and programme 
development. In Afghanistan, the state has retained a role in regulation and 
monitoring through the donor-funded Grants and Contract Management Unit 
(GCMU), situated within the Ministry of Health. There is broad agreement that 
partnerships „are only likely to be effective if governments maintain an active role in 
the management of the agreements rather than being left as a third party as 
international donors collaborate separately with NGOs‟ (Waters, 2007). Where 
contract management and payments originate in public ministries, they can arguably 
shift accountability from donors and NGOs to the state (Zivetz, 2006:21). On the 
other hand, institutional structures which completely bypass the state impact 
adversely on local level accountability. In Nepal, the World Bank contracted out rural 
water supply projects to NGOs and the private sector through a „Fund Board‟ – an 
institution that was located separately from local government structures. This 
institutional approach was criticised for encouraging accountability towards the Fund 
Board, rather than the community served. In addition, the rigid, input-focused nature 
of the contracts is seen to have restricted NGOs from using approaches to suit local 
conditions and needs (Clayton, 1999). 
 
In situations of both low capacity and low will, donors have „substituted‟ for the role of 
government with a view to eventual handover. This has been the case in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, where government has been more or less excluded 
from the process, and USAID has employed what Waldman (2006) calls the „state 
avoidance‟ strategy of establishing contracts between the donor and contractor. In 
the very worst cases – states that are „utterly failing‟ where there is no real prospect 
of reforming the civil service – Collier has advocated experimenting with a new 
institutional arrangement for contracting: Independent Service Authorities. These 
agencies would be autonomous from government, but jointly managed by 
government, donors and civil society, and would act as a wholesale contractor of 
both public and non-state service provision. These agencies are however seen as a 
last resort, not an option to be widely pursued, since they bypass government, rather 
than pursue incremental reform within the civil service (Collier, 2007)22. Whilst they 
might initially rely solely on donor funding, they are seen by Collier as permanent 
public institutions: „Over time…the government might choose to channel more of its 
own revenues devoted to social spending through the ISA rather than through the 
spending ministries, whose role would then become focused on policy design. 
Similarly, the composition of the ISA board could evolve to phase out donor 
representatives as the government became confident that it could retain donor 
confidence and finance without them‟ (Collier, 2007).  
 
The independent agency approach is acknowledged to be untested, but has some 
similarities with the practice in French West African countries of setting up specialist 
agencies (e.g. AGETIP in Senegal and AGETUR in Benin) with donor support to 
handle the contracting of infrastructure works (Fanou and Grant, 2000)23. Experience 
from Rwanda suggests that an independent well equipped fund holder organization 
which is able to separate the purchasing, service delivery and regulatory roles of 
local health authorities from the technical role of contract negotiation and fund 
disbursement can help avoid the possibilities for rent-seeking (Soeters, 2006). On the 
other hand, Sondorp argues that in the case of Afghanistan, the relative autonomy 
and isolation of the GCMU from the process of policy and strategy formulation meant 
                                                 
22
 Key features of Independent Service Authorities are: they facilitate a high degree of civil society scrutiny over 
service delivery; set up a basis of competition between public, private and NGO provision; and perform continuous 
evaluation to determine whether government, NGO or private provision works best. 
23
  AGETIP‟s role may now have extended to social sectors – see http://www.agetip.sn/ 
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that services contracted out may not be fully aligned with public health priorities 
(Sondorp, cited in Balabanova et al, 2008:37). 
 
Informal and mutual agreements 
Much research on relations between governments and NGOs in service delivery 
describes them as operating on a range between cooperation and conflict (Teamey 
and Mcloughlin, 2009). More cooperative forms of relationship may occur within the 
framework of loosely formalised agreements that retain a strong relational (informal 
and flexible) element. Research on South Asia found that sustained relationships had 
often evolved out of a history of informal contact that might then lead on to a more 
formalised written agreement24. This is opposite to the trajectory widely described in 
developed countries where formal contracts precede the development of trust and 
relational understandings (MacNeil 1978, Gazely 2007, Brown and Troutt 2004, Van 
Slyke 2006). The research in South Asia indicated that the evolutionary and informal 
nature of relationships provided an important basis of trust and mutual influence. 
 
Informal agreements may also be „mutual‟, where government and NGOs contribute 
their own separate funding to common or complementary ends and take on distinct 
roles. These arguably depend more on accumulated social capital and may be less 
technically demanding because parties bring their own financial and human 
resources, and neither stands in authority over the other (Batley, 2006). An example 
of collaboration through division of roles is in Bangladesh, where government signed 
MOUs with NGOs for the delivery of the National TB control Programme which 
outlined the respective tasks. Government provided treatment protocols, policy 
guidelines, drugs supplies and overall monitoring, while NGOs provided essential 
services in local implementation, management and awareness-raising. In this case, 
the authors argued that ‟trust, recognition of comparative advantage, favourable 
regulatory frameworks, effective monitoring, transparency, and continued 
commitment are considered essential preconditions for successful and sustainable 
collaboration‟ (Ullah, 2006). A similar arrangement has been successful in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where NGOs have supported the 
implementation of government TB programme in hard to reach provinces. This case 
demonstrates that collaboration is possible even in very poor socio-economic 
situations where the state is disorganised, but only if consultation and dialogue are in 
place and if partners have clearly defined roles and responsibilities (Ndongosieme et 
al, 2007). 
 
Partnerships based on mutual contributions may only be a means of achieving 
collective goals when there is a good strategic fit between collaborators, and when 
the benefits outweigh individual action (Aga Khan, 2007:25). A counter-case to the 
success in Bangladesh and DRC is in Pakistan, where the leasing out of government 
school buildings to private schools for an afternoon shift in return for which the NGOs 
have to pay for improvements to the building raised criticisms that „partnership‟ was a 
means of extraction rather than facilitation (Rose, 2006). The South Asian research 
referred to above found that the NGOs that were most likely to relate with 
government on the basis of mutuality were those that were more independent in their 
funding, i.e. they did not depend on tied project funding but on untied grants and 
donations. 
 
Co-production, which involves an informal agreement between formal organisations 
and communities or service recipients, has seen some success in low capacity 
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 This research is currently being written up for publication. Working papers are available at 
http://www.idd.bham.ac.uk/research/Service_Providers.shtml#Whose 
 29 
settings.25 Water and sanitation are rich in cases of co-production, the most widely 
cited being that of the Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) in Pakistan. Here, public utilities 
provide large sewers in agreement with community lane committees to fund and 
develop local sanitation systems, facilitated by an experienced local NGO. OPP has 
untied independent funding, avoids written agreements, and pursues its own 
approach to community sanitation in informal, relational agreements with government 
and communities. Another example is Somalia, where urban private-public 
partnerships are planned to be extended to rural areas where community committees 
have been failing to effectively operate. This project will support the relevant 
authorities to regulate and oversee the management of rural water systems, and the 
community committees will become community oversight bodies freed from daily 
operational issues to consider the wider effects of water usage.26 That such cases 
seem particularly to occur in the water and sanitation sectors may relate to the fact 
that infrastructure has relatively lighter professional maintenance and management 
requirements by comparison with health and education, and local level systems are 
technically not complex. Moreover, neighbourhood based services (such as water 
and sanitation) where everyone has the same day to day experience of its 
performance provide the basis for local organisation (Batley 2006:250). 
 
Specific local relationships in the form of mutual agreements and co-production may 
present problems of scaling-up into large programmes. However, they may offer the 
promise of scale and sustainability in other ways: they do not depend on external 
subsidy, the schemes have become institutionalised in the practice of local NGOs, 
and they are scaled-up not through large organisational structures but by replication 
of a model to other NGOs. 
 
                                                 
25
 Ostrom 1997 argues the central point of co-production is that no single principal is in control of all inputs to produce 
a service output, that production involves multiple public and private agencies including recipients/citizens. 
26
 For further information about this project, contact WELL 
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4. The focus of approaches to enhancing state effectiveness 
 
Based on the evidence from the preceding sections, the following applies our own 
judgement to the feasibility and risk of the alternative forms of state engagement with 
NSP.  It presents a schematic view which might well be questioned in detail or in its 
direct application to particular contexts. 
 
Table 1 presents the types of engagement in two broad categories: (i) Those that are 
unlikely to harm non-state provision if they are performed badly, but which could 
support good service provision if they are done well – policy dialogue, setting the 
policy framework and entering mutual agreements. They are relatively risk free 
because they affect only the general environment of service provision and/or do not 
impact obligatorily on specific non-state actors. (ii) Those – regulation and contracts 
– that imply a direct controlling and coordinating role for the state, that impose 
obligations on specific NSPs, and that therefore risk doing harm.  
 
Table 1 also organises alternative activities within each type of engagement in a 
hierarchy going from those which demand less capacity to those that demand more. 
The potential for failed interventions increases as we move up each column. So, for 
reasons outlined in section 3, making short-term contracts demands less capacity 
(and present less risk of failure) than long-term concession arrangements. 
Comprehensive contracting out and universal regulation of providers are more 
demanding than localised approaches. Contracting of physical infrastructure presents 
fewer challenges than the contracting of social services. 
 
The dilemma for donors, governments and those who do business with them is that 
the most desirable interventions from a service delivery viewpoint – for example, 
getting mass service delivery quickly operational by contracting it universally to 
NGOs - present high risk of failure, if government lacks the capacity to contract and 
the institutional conditions are not in place to enforce contract. From a state building 
perspective, the institutional conditions should be established before very concrete 
initiatives are taken to work with NSPs. The latter would argue for an incremental 
process of dialogue, leading to the design of legally and financially supported policy 
frameworks, and the step-by-step development of capacity to contract and regulate. 
This would both recognise the difficulty of building „relational‟ capacity (Robinson 
2008) whilst also presenting opportunities to do so incrementally, learning by doing 
with other local (non-state) actors. 
 
The table assumes that the engagement is directly undertaken by government, 
supported by donors. In this case, the „independent regulator‟ would be a regulatory 
body appointed by government but expected to act autonomously. Since this is 
extremely unlikely to be achievable in the context of the most fragile states – and is 
difficult even in the UK – alternatives can be considered. A regulatory or contracting 
body could be set up with a high degree of donor involvement (or oversight) and a 
residual or even nominal role for government, as in the Collier proposal for 
independent service authorities. This would reduce the capacity demands of large-
scale contracting or regulation by detaching them from the local political context – but 
at the cost of state building. 
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Table 1:  Types and levels of government engagement with NSPs 
 
Required 
levels of 
capacity 
Types of Engagement  
Lower risk – non-obligatory engagement  Higher risk – more obligatory 
engagement 
 Dialogue Mutual 
agreements for 
service 
delivery 
Creating the 
policy 
environment 
Regulation Contracting 
Higher levels 
of capacity  
 
 
Long-term 
compacts  for 
wider, shared 
activities 
between 
governments 
and NGO/CBOs 
 Independent 
output  
regulation of 
quality, 
accessibility and 
price of all 
government and 
NSP services 
 
Long term , wide-
ranging contracts 
for concession or 
franchise of social 
service provision  
 
 
 
Medium 
levels of 
capacity 
National and 
local 
dialogue 
about 
standards of 
provision, 
roles, 
relationships 
and spheres 
of operation 
 
 
 
 
Specific, local 
agreements of 
joint financing in 
complementary 
projects – 
MOUs and co-
production 
between govt 
and NGO/CBOs 
 
General and 
sector policy 
frameworks 
identify roles 
and relations of 
state/NSP 
 
 
 
 
 
Legal 
recognition of 
NSPs and  their 
rights to provide 
services 
Application of 
legal requirements 
for government 
approved 
providers 
 
 
Publicising 
surveys of 
government and 
NSP performance 
and costs 
 
Encouragement of 
o Consumer  
forums and 
watch groups 
o Franchising 
by large to 
small NSPs 
o Self 
accreditation 
by NSP 
associations 
 
Medium term 
service or 
management 
contracts for govt 
finance of 
localised private 
sector or NGO 
social service 
providers 
 
 
 
Medium term 
service or 
management 
contracts for govt 
finance of  
localised  private 
infrastructure 
providers 
 
 
 
 
 
Lower levels 
of capacity 
Programme 
of informal 
encounters 
between 
govt and 
NSP 
nationally 
 
Exploring 
options for 
collaboration 
at local level 
 
Exchange of 
experience 
at local and 
national 
level 
Agreement 
between 
specific NGOs 
and  
government 
agencies on 
target standards 
etc, arising from 
dialogue 
Political 
agreement that 
NSPs are 
legitimate actors 
            
                                                                                               
 
 
Non-
interference in 
acceptable NSP 
activities  
 
 
 
Mapping of 
scale and type 
of NSP 
 
Mutual planning of 
standards by govt 
and NSPs wishing 
to collaborate 
 
 
 
Establishing (but 
minimizing) „entry‟ 
requirements 
based on service 
inputs 
Government 
contracting in of 
specific inputs to 
its own services in 
„spot contracts‟ 
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Table 1 can also be used to locate the types of approach to capacity-building that 
donors have typically undertaken, as indicated in the previous section. Donor activity 
has focused on promoting only a few of the alternative forms of engagement: 
- Formal national level policy dialogue rather than the local and less formal 
dialogue that would be more likely to engage with direct service providers 
- Development of general and sector policy frameworks, with emphasis 
given to „partnerships‟ in service delivery 
- Contracting by governments (with donor financing) in large-scale, medium 
or long-term programmes 
- Establishing accountability of service providers to consumer groups. 
 
Donors have left largely untouched the spheres of informal and more local level 
dialogue; informal, more mutual agreements between governments and NSPs; and 
the whole sphere of regulation. Informal, mutual and local level engagement present 
opportunities for learning and the development of trust between state and non-state 
actors - but, on the other hand, present problems of „scaling-up‟. 
 
Table 2 summarises the internal organisational, inter-organisational, and external 
institutional factors that the literature indicates constrain state effectiveness in 
regulation and contracting and that therefore make them riskier interventions.  
 
Table 2: Factors constraining state effectiveness to perform higher risk roles 
 
 
Factors Regulation Contracting 
Internal 
organisational 
factors 
Weak administrative and accounting 
skills, and capacity for monitoring, 
performance assessment and 
enforcement 
 
Vested professional interests 
 
Inadequate information on price and 
performance 
 
Lack of experience of regulation 
 
Retention of qualified staff 
Weak basic administrative and financial 
systems and skills 
 
Poor information systems to compare and 
monitor contractors 
 
Staff resistance and lack of incentive 
 
Lack of experience of contracting – design, 
performance assessment and enforcement 
 
Difficulty retaining qualified staff 
Inter-
organisational 
factors 
Mistrust between regulators and NSPs 
 
Blurred boundaries between state and 
non-state activities – the regulators 
and the regulated 
 
Lack of trust, credibility and legitimacy 
between actors 
 
Poor definition and co-ordination of roles 
between state agencies and with NSPs 
 
Gap between central contract design and 
local implementation agencies 
External 
institutional 
factors 
Weak and inconsistent regulatory 
framework  
 
Economic and political instability 
 
Political pressure on regulator, and 
lack of political will for enforcement 
 
Weak demands of civil society 
 
Neutrality of regulatory role not 
understood 
 
Weak framework of contract law 
 
Lack of policy continuity 
 
Economic and financial instability. Absence 
of guaranteed long-term funding 
 
Social and political resistance to 
„privatisation‟ 
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5. Conclusion and policy implications: How can governments 
effectively engage with non-state providers of basic services 
where capacity is weak? 
 
It may be useful for donors and governments to think of types of engagement as 
suggested in Table 1, according to (i) the more or less obligatory nature of 
engagement with specific NSPs and therefore the risk of doing harm through poor or 
unsustained interventions, and (ii) the levels and types of capacity required for 
specific activities. Low levels of obligation and risk are imposed on NSPs by policy 
dialogue, setting the policy environment and entering mutual agreements. Higher 
levels of obligation and risk are imposed by formal contracts and regulation.  
 
From a state-building perspective, it is a logical progression of institutional 
development to address first the general policy environment and to learn through 
mutually agreed relationships, before embarking on large-scale contracting and 
regulation. However, the particular context of fragile states presents a dilemma 
between the need to build engagement incrementally and the need to respond 
quickly to service imperatives. From a service delivery perspective, the scale and 
destruction of services may require large scale and more interventionist approaches 
and the fragmented nature of non-state provision may indicate the need for quick co-
ordination. Paradoxically then, fragile and conflict affected states, where state 
capacity may be particularly weak and institutions need building, may be pushed into 
„prematurely‟ direct forms of state engagement before the development of the 
underlying institutional structures. 
 
Key lessons from the case studies  
 
Government capacity to plan, co-ordinate, organize, regulate and finance the 
non-state sector is severely constrained in fragile settings. However, this is also 
true in most developing countries. The most acute constraints on government 
undertaking indirect roles in service provision are at the general level of the state‟s 
legitimacy, coverage and competence. In regard to engagement with NSP, there are 
basic constraints of 1) Lack of basic information about the non-state sector – its 
activities, its goals, services provided, costs of services. This lack of basic 
information consistently undermines the task of developing appropriate standards, 
providing adequate financing, and setting and enforcing appropriate regulations.  2) 
Lack of basic organizational capacity to form and maintain relationships with NSPs, 
or to monitor their activities.  
 
There may be reluctance on the part of governments to withdraw from the 
direct role of provider to take on the indirect roles of oversight and 
stewardship. 
The indirect roles may be less politically prestigious, offer less patronage 
opportunities and reduce public sector employment. Governments may be more 
willing to engage with NSPs where there is recognition that government cannot alone 
deliver all services, and where public and private services are not in competition. This 
is more likely in health, water and sanitation than education.  
 
Where there is lack of willingness to engage, governments may need evidence 
that successful collaboration is possible, that complementarities can be found, 
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and that there is political advantage as a result. This can be demonstrated through 
small scale, pilot approaches at local level (e.g. contracting or informal collaboration).   
 
As much as government capacity, the capacity and willingness of non-state 
actors influences the potential for successful engagement  
In some cases, NSPs may initiate collaboration and engagement; in others they are 
too sceptical or unorganised to enter into the forms of engagement that donors or 
governments intend (e.g. formal policy dialogue, formal large-scale contracting). 
Understanding the nature of the non-state sector in any given context (size, formality, 
level of organisation), and the limits to its own willingness to engage with government 
is an important starting point for designing forms of engagement that are mutually 
beneficial.  
 
The extent to which engagements are ‘pro-service’ is likely also to be influenced 
by: 
a) Government motives for engagement. Real, underlying motives can range 
from the wish to prohibit, control or takeover NSP, to genuinely seeking 
partnership. Where there is limited recognition of the right of NSPs to exist, 
where government intention is to seek to control or inhibit NSP activities, or to 
reduce direct competition between government services and NSP services, 
interventions will not improve service outcomes. Channelling donor funds 
through a government that is not good-willed to NSP offers it a powerful 
instrument for exercising control. 
b) The extent to which the providers that are most important to poor people 
are engaged. Informal or small providers are often overlooked by 
governments in planning and dialogue, and can be ruled out of contractual 
arrangements by their limited size and organisational capacity. 
 
Lessons in relation to specific roles 
 
Formal policy dialogue between government and NSPs, which requires a stable 
policy environment, may be imperfect, unrepresentative and at times unhelpful 
in fragile settings. It is very often constrained by mistrust, lack of credibility or 
legitimacy associated with all actors and is also prone to being hijacked by large 
NGOs. Donors can create spaces for dialogue in unstable settings, but formal 
dialogue needs to allow actors autonomy, should seek to find complementarities, and 
should ultimately lead to other forms of engagement (e.g. partnership, or agreement 
about standard setting). Dialogue at this level is at the best only an entry point to 
effective collaboration between state- and non-state actors. 
 
Informal and local level dialogue - at the operational level - could more likely be 
where synergies can be found. This is where mutual lessons can be learned and 
an understanding of constraints and opportunities on both sides can be developed. 
This type of dialogue is likely to be ongoing. But as with formal dialogue, informal 
dialogue can either be pro-service or anti-service. 
 
Regulation is more likely to be ‘pro-service’ where it offers incentives for 
compliance, and where it focuses on standards in terms of outputs and 
outcomes rather than inputs and entry controls. In most cases, command and 
control regulation has been unnecessarily elaborate and input-focused, placing 
unrealistic capacity requirements on both the implementing agency and the NSP, 
with the result that this sort of regulation is often unenforced or avoided. Two 
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alternatives that place less demands on the actors and are more capable of being 
focused on improving services are: (i) „lighter touch‟ forms of regulation, where the 
rules are slimmed down, focused more on the quality of outputs and based more on 
incentives than controls, and (ii) substitutes for state regulation, such as external and 
self-accreditation, franchised service provision and community monitoring. 
 
Wide scale, performance-based contracting has been successful in delivering 
services in some fragile and post-conflict settings. But this approach relies 
heavily on donor support, and is often entered into reluctantly by governments. The 
sustainability of institutional arrangements for contracting that are separate from, or 
completely bypass, governments depend for their sustainability on the continued 
presence of donors. Where institutional arrangements bypass normal governmental 
channels they also distort accountability relationships. In stabilising contexts, partner 
country government ministries should be active participants in planning and 
developing contracts. The relationship between (semi-)independent contracting 
agencies and the potential for the progressive capacitation of the state is unknown, 
but the experience of French West African agencies for contracting infrastructure is 
worth investigating further.  
 
Some successful contractual agreements with NGOs have a strong informal, 
relational element and grow out of earlier informal connections. They have 
worked well where responsibility for contracting is devolved to the level of 
government responsible for implementing it. There is a need for clarity of roles, but 
also flexibility to allow NGOs to draw on their strengths and to innovate. Small-scale 
contracts can be tailored to the local context, and allow the incremental development 
of capacity. Capacities required for contracting will differ according to the sector, and 
the scale, level of formality, and length of contract. 
 
Informal and mutual agreements, based on independent contributions by the 
partners and non-hierarchic relationships between them can avoid the capacity 
problems and tensions implicit in formal contracting but may present other 
problems of non-transparency, non- competition, and possible abuse of the trust on 
which they are founded. 
 
Policy implications 
 
Recognise non-state service provision and adopt the do no harm principle  
NSP is here to stay, and may even grow and flourish in more stable states. This 
should not be seen as a problem in itself, but as part of the solution. It would be 
wrong to set the ambition of 'managing‟ non-state provision in its entirety - this has 
not happened in any developing country - and it can be very harmful for low-capacity 
states to seek to regulate all NSP or to draw it into clumsy contracts.  
 
Beware of generalisation 
Non-state provision takes many forms in response to different histories. Its particular 
organizational form and capacity, the importance of its activities, who it serves, its 
accessibility to sections of the population, and the nature of its relationship with the 
state vary greatly between locations. Moreover, all of these may shift rapidly in 
response to political and economic change – as new elites come to power, and new 
relationships and employment opportunities follow them. The possibilities and case 
for state engagement have to be periodically re-assessed not assumed. 
 
 36 
Also, the particular identities of NGOs and enterprises should be considered in 
deciding with whom and how the state should engage. While many NGOs and CBOs 
have an interest in working with government to improve service delivery some forms 
of engagement may challenge the capacity and also threaten the autonomy of those 
that are nearer to being civil society actors. Classical contracts may be more suitable 
to enterprises; looser partnerships more suitable particularly to local NGOs – though 
this should not free them from accountability for performance. 
 
State building can occur through any of the types of engagement with NSPs. 
Types of engagement should therefore be selected on the basis of their likely 
effectiveness in improving service delivery. 
Governments and donors are faced with difficult strategic choices about how to 
deploy their limited capacity for engagement with NSPs most effectively, and without 
risk to pro-poor or pro-service outcomes. In fragile or conflict-affected settings, there 
is the dual goal of supporting state building. There is no meaningful way of resolving 
this trade-off by deciding which of the possible functions (policy, regulation, 
contracting or direct service delivery) would be more inclined to build states and then 
trying to bring them about regardless of context. The better approach is to accept that 
undertaking any of these functions is a state-building activity, and then to identify, in 
the particular country context, which if any mode of engagement would  
(a) most enable improved (pro-poor) service provision 
(b) be most feasible in terms of capacity and willingness to undertake them 
(c) present the lowest risk of failure and damage to NSP. 
 
Begin with less risky/small scale forms of engagement where possible 
There may also be a trade-off between the effects of forms of engagement on service 
delivery and the risks resulting from bad engagement. In an ideal situation, 
contracting out service delivery and regulating non-state provision may present the 
quicker and more direct ways of bringing about improved service delivery but they 
also present risks. Regulation and contracting impact very directly on non-state 
actors and, if done badly, can damage existing service providers with no gain. Small-
scale contracts and experiments in more localised regulation present less risk. Policy 
dialogue and attempts to improve the policy environment (e.g. through dialogue, 
creating policy frameworks and legislation) may have only long-term positive effects, 
but also carry small risks to non-state actors; moreover, these are clearly roles that 
only the state can perform. Encouraging mutual agreements and coordination 
between state and non-state actors present opportunities for learning and no risk but 
can only have local immediate effects.  
 
Adopt mixed approaches 
The choice between forms of engagement does not have to be absolute. Rather than 
adopting a uniform plan of engagement in a particular country, it may be better to try 
different approaches in different regions or sectors. This could reduce the strain on 
government, for example of having to manage dialogue, regulation or contracting on 
a uniform national basis. Different approaches also present the opportunity for trial 
and learning. Direct state service delivery could function (perhaps with contracting in 
of NSP inputs) in some areas; contracting out to INGOs or firms in others; policy 
dialogue and encouragement of self-regulation could apply more generally and 
include even those NSPs which  will continue to operate without any direct 
engagement with the state. 
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